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Abstract 
Firms’ social capital, captured by corporate social responsibility (CSR), can serve as an 
operational hedging instrument for firm-specific negative shocks. This paper assess CSR’s 
hedging effectiveness against risks arising from political uncertainty and industry-wide 
economic shocks. We find that CSR has a significant mitigating effect on stock return volatility 
making it an effective reputational hedge against political risk such as gubernatorial elections, 
especially for closely contested elections. However, CSR’s hedging is effective only for market 
risk (stock volatility) and not for cash flow volatility. Meanwhile, a difference-in-difference 
estimation suggests that CSR is not an effective hedge against risk during industry-wide 
economic shocks. Finally, CSR’s mitigating effect on stock volatility is transient.  
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“CSR has moved from the periphery of business to center stage.”  
Unilever Chairman Niall Fitzgerald (2003). 
1. Introduction 
The focus on social capital as a significant link to ultimate success or failure has been on 
the rise over the past few years. For instance, a 2017 survey by Deloitte shows that 88% of 
millennials judge a firm on the basis of its social impact in addition to financial performance. 
Meanwhile, a 2018 Deloitte survey shows that 77% of global leaders consider a company’s 
social impact track record and corporate citizenship to matter to stakeholders. Social capital 
also has significant tangible effects. During periods of unexpectedly low trust investors 
perceive firms with high social capital to be more trustworthy and place higher valuation 
premiums on these firms (Lins et al., 2017). However, enhancing social capital comes with the 
trade-off of reduced financial flexibility, especially at times of negative shocks when firms 
need to balance stakeholders’ expectations and social capital against earnings targets (Becchetti 
et al., 2015). Therefore, high social capital firms have a reduced flexibility leading to their 
earnings being relatively less predictable, which increases firm risk. This paper addresses two 
questions. Can CSR mitigate the potential fallout of political and industry-wide adverse effects 
and uncertainty? Does the potential hedging effect of CSR last over the long-term?  
From a firm’s perspective, social capital defines the relationship quality that a firm and its 
executives build with their stakeholders (Servaes and Tamayo, 2017), whereas corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) is a core business strategy to build social capital (Antoni and Sacconi, 
2011). Therefore, CSR activities can be a proxy for firms’ social capital.1 For instance, 
evidence already exists suggesting that CSR affects firm value by reducing the cost of capital 
(Hasan et al., 2017) and improving cash flows (Gregory et al., 2014).  
                                                          
 
1 Hereafter, we use the term “social capital” and “CSR” interchangeably.  
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Based on the signaling theory, CSR investment reduces information asymmetries between 
firm and stakeholders by signaling firms’ unobservable moral attributes (Rindova et al., 2005; 
Porter and Kramer, 2006) and build a good reputation (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). 
Moreover, the trust that firms build with their stakeholders via CSR allows them to perform 
better during a financial crisis (Lins et al., 2017) and firm-specific negative shocks (e.g., 
Godfrey et al., 2009; Choi and Wang, 2009). In response to the CSR reputation the relevant 
stakeholders trust firms during firm-specific negative events (i.e., reputation effects in a 
repeated game). We argue that in order to understand the hedging ability of CSR, the focus 
should also be on regional or industry-wide uncertainty.  
Based on the interaction between signaling theory and reputation effects in the repeated 
game, when there is an economy-wide or industry-wide adverse shock CSR reputation can be 
used as an operational hedge to protect a firm as is the case for firm-specific adverse events. 
Overall, it is reasonable to expect that CSR reputation has an inverse relation with firm risk 
during an economic or industry-wide crisis. By exploring the hedging ability of CSR we 
provide empirical evidence to firms’ risk management initiatives which can benefit firm value 
during times of economic and industry-wide uncertainty. Therefore, we examine the hedging 
ability of CSR for two components of idiosyncratic volatility: stock return volatility and cash 
flow volatility. 2 
For empirical identification we use two exogenous shocks that affect firm risk. First, we 
use a gubernatorial election year as an economy-wide political risk. A strand of the literature 
argues that as incumbents have incentives to signal higher competency before the election in 
response to the myopic behavior of voters, political cycles arise in macroeconomic policies 
                                                          
 
2 By decomposing the firm-level stock return variance, Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Vuolteenaho (2002) show 
that idiosyncratic volatility originates from cash flow shocks and expected return shocks. 
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(Nordhaus, 1975; Rogoff, 1987). Subsequently, potential policy changes surrounding these 
cycles and electoral competitiveness create uncertainty in a business environment (Gulen and 
Ion, 2016; Baker et al., 2016; Julio and Yook, 2016). Political uncertainty augments the 
expected return volatility around an election as the stock return has exposure to systematic 
economic forces (Fama and French, 1988, 1989; Campbell, 1985; Chen, 1991; Bailey and 
Chung, 1995). The second exogenous shocks we use are significant reductions in industry-
level import tariffs which are exogenous macroeconomic shocks. Import tariff cuts intensify 
competitive pressure from foreign competitors for all domestic firms in the industry (Bernard 
et al., 2006). Therefore, a significant tariff cut creates industry-wide adverse cash flow shock 
(Kini et al., 2017).  
We analyze all publicly listed U.S. firms, excluding financial and utilities firms, during 
2002 to 2016. As gubernatorial elections occur in different states and at different times, they 
give us a powerful econometric test. In addition to time series variation, gubernatorial elections 
have a cross-sectional variation which strengthens our findings. Arguably, a reverse causality 
between CSR and risk can exist, since, firm risk can also affect its CSR engagement (Hong et 
al., 2012; Albuquerque et al., 2018). Since this reverse causality can potentially lead to biased 
results we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach to measure CSR-risk relation by 
instrumenting CSR with average CSR rating for each industry-year pair and state-year pair 
(excluding focal firm). Alternatively, we apply difference-in-difference methodology and use 
industry-level import tariff cuts as a quasi-natural experiment to isolate the causal effect of risk 
on CSR.  
Our findings suggest that CSR reputation reduces stock return volatility during an election 
year. Moreover, the hedging-ability of CSR has a stronger impact during the uncertainty caused 
by closely contested elections compared to all other election years. Our findings suggest that 
shareholders value firm-specific social capital during periods of economic uncertainty driven 
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by elections and this reliance increases with the degree of uncertainty. Our results are also 
economically significant. For instance, a one-standard-deviation increase in CSR score reduces 
the stock return volatility by 6.52% during a gubernatorial election and 10.96% during closely 
contested election for firms headquartered in states facing gubernatorial election. However, we 
do not find strong evidence that CSR reputation can mitigate cash flow volatility during 
political uncertainty. We argue that this is driven by the fact that firms increase cash holdings 
as a precautionary buffer during an election year (Julio and Yook, 2012) and because the 
uncertainty regarding future cash flows driven by the uncertainty of future political party 
orientation (Boutchkova et al., 2012). Therefore, there is a weak relation between CSR and 
cash flow volatility.  
We also test whether CSR has a longer-term or transient hedging ability by assessing its 
impact on firm risk during the post-election period. Our results support the argument that the 
CSR reputation effect on firm risk is transient. Moreover, from a difference-in-difference 
empirical setting we find that just by having a CSR score has a mitigating effect on firms’ stock 
return volatility during industry-wide economic shocks, such as import tariff cuts. However, 
we find that although CSR reduces stock return volatility and cash flow volatility, whether 
firms have a high or low CSR score has no impact on firm risk during times of industry-wide 
economic shocks. Overall, CSR is an effective reputational hedge against regional political risk 
(elections), but not so for industry-wide economic shocks (import tariff cuts). However, CSR’s 
hedging ability is transient and does not persist during the years following the shock.  
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses development 
2.1. Social Capital, CSR, and operational hedging  
In a broader sense, social capital is the productive value of social networks. Leana and Van 
Buren (1999) delineate social capital from an organizational perspective and define it as a 
resource that reveals the propensity of social relations between a firm and its stakeholders. 
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However, it is challenging to measure social capital due to its broadly defined definitions. To 
address this challenge, we follow the view of some recent works (Degli Antoni and Sacconi, 
2011; Lins et al., 2017) and consider CSR activities as a proxy for firms’ social capital. CSR 
can generate social capital by building trust while it establishes cooperating networks between 
the company and its stakeholders. This feature of CSR directly conforms to ‘civic engagement’ 
and ‘trust and cooperative norms’ aspects of cognitive and structural theories of social capital.3  
The concept of CSR has gradually shifted from macro-social effects to the organizational level 
effect (Idowu et al., 2010). In line with resource-based view (RBV) and instrumental 
stakeholder theory CSR creates firm value by generating competitive advantages (Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2006) in a number of ways. For instance via socially responsible human resource 
activities (Turban and Greening, 1997) and superior environmental performance (Russo and 
Fouts, 1997; Mcwilliams and Siegel, 2001).  
Reputation is another channel of value creation, which also motivates firms to engage in 
CSR (Porter and Kramer, 2006). CSR investment reduces information asymmetries between 
firms and stakeholders (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Hur et al., 2014), and builds reputation 
by signaling unobservable firm attributes (such as quality, capability, honesty) (Rindova et al., 
2005; Miller et al., 2009; Porter and Kramer, 2006). This CSR function complies with the basic 
concept of the signaling theory. Moreover, high-CSR firms signal the executives’ competency 
and morality to stakeholders (Milbourn, 2003; Francis et al., 2008) and enhance managerial 
reputation (Borghesi et al., 2014; Dögl and Holtbrügge, 2014).4 CSR reputation accumulates 
                                                          
 
3 Cognitive perspective refers to internal and subjective form of social capital, such as shared norms, values, 
attitudes, and beliefs (Putnam, 1999; Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000). Structural theory refers to the pattern and 
intensity of networks to create and maintain social relationships (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000). 
4 We assume that CEOs align, at least partially, their personal reputation with their firms’ reputation.  
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social capital by fostering good relations with external parties such as customers (Walker and 
Kent, 2009; Lev et al., 2010), employees (Greening and Turban, 2000; Edmans, 2011), 
investors (Minor and Morgan, 2011), creditors, and suppliers (Maden et al., 2012).CSR 
reputation contributes to firm value not only through the reputational gain as a reward for 
positive behavior but also by mitigating the risk of reputational losses emerging from adverse 
firm-specific events (Peloza, 2006; Minor and Morgan, 2011). This is due to regulators, 
investors, customers, and other stakeholders trust on companies’ explanation and perceived 
sincerity of proposed remedial activities (Brown, 1998). In sum, we can posit that CSR 
investment accumulates social capital for the firm and create value as an operational hedging 
instrument.5 Therefore, it indicates that relevant stakeholders provide premium for CSR 
reputation, which is in line with reputation effects in repeated game.6  
The operational hedging ability of CSR is studied from different viewpoints. Vanhamme 
and Grobben (2009) show that firms with long history of CSR have higher ability to counter 
the adverse effects of a crisis, albeit based on accusations of animal testing. Gregory et al. 
(2014) consider firms with positive CSR activities as “Green” firms, whereas firms with 
negative CSR activities are considered as “Toxic” firms. Overall, the results show that CSR 
activities improve cash flows through the reduction of firm-specific risk, which could be visible 
either in the form of higher profitability immediately, or in the form of superior long-run 
                                                          
 
5 We can refer CSR as an operational hedging instrument as it is a non-financial instrument and increases firm 
value by reducing deadweight costs of financial distress through operational activities. By following the same 
reasoning, repurchase as flexible pay-out structure (Bonaimé et al., 2014), geographic diversification for MNCs 
(Allayannis et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2006), and acquisition (Hankins, 2011) are considered as operational hedging 
in the contemporary finance literature. 
6 In repeated games, agents could try to generate reputation for a specific characteristic in the early stages of the 
game. In later stage it payoffs if that characteristics improve.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3316174 
8 
 
growth prospects (e.g., Choi and Wang, 2009). Godfrey et al. (2009) argue that CSR investment 
mitigates firm-specific risk triggered by firm-specific adverse events. Based on the case study 
of firm-specific adverse events, Minor and Morgan (2011) show CSR activities protect firm 
stock price against loss of reputation following adverse events (see also Herremans et al., 1993; 
Shiu and Yang, 2017)).  
This paper draws on the interaction between signaling theory and reputation effects in 
repeated game. We argue that when a politically driven economy-wide or industry-wide event 
occurs, CSR reputation is likely to protect the firm as it does for firm-specific adverse events. 
We expect that during these uncertain periods, idiosyncratic volatility is lower for firms with 
accumulated CSR reputation as well as social capital. Therefore, our study highlights an 
enhanced hedging ability of CSR and depict that social capital can be beneficial for firm value 
during economy-wide or industry-wide uncertainty. The hedging ability of CSR can affect 
value in two ways. First, because investors prefer to invest in companies with high CSR 
reputation (Brown, 1998; Maden et al., 2012), the cost of equity is lower for these firms (El 
Ghoul et al., 2011). Also, creditors lower the cost of debt for these firms due to lower default 
risk (Webb, 2005; Kim et al., 2009; Goss and Roberts, 2011). Therefore, high CSR firms have 
better access to finance at a relatively lower cost of capital stemming from a lower risk premium 
(Bassen et al., 2006; Cao et al., 2015; Hasan et al., 2017). Since the value of a firm is the present 
value of future expected cash flows, by reducing the cost of capital, high CSR investment can 
increase shareholder value (Gregory et al., 2014). Second, Stultz (2002) argues that risk 
reduction can increase the firm value if the perfect market assumptions are violated. Since 
capital markets have frictions such as information asymmetry, tax convexity, and financial 
distress, cash flow volatility is costly (Tufano, 1996; Aǧca and Mozumdar, 2008; Hankins, 
2011). Therefore, hedging can increase firm value by reducing cash flow variability (Stulz, 
1990; Froot et al., 1993), which affects both investment and financial decisions of the firm. 
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Hence, by reducing cash flow volatility, CSR reputation can create value as an operational 
hedging instrument.  
2.2. Operational hedging ability of CSR during political uncertainty 
Political cycles arise in macroeconomic policies in response to myopic behavior of voters. 
Such political business cycles reflect the incumbents’ tendency to manipulate macroeconomic 
policy in order increase their chances of winning an election by following an inflationary boom 
and lower unemployment rate prior to the election followed by deflationary policies after the 
election (Nordhaus, 1975). Meanwhile, the political budget cycle creates a distortion of fiscal 
policies by lowering taxes and increasing government consumption spending sub-optimally 
prior to the election (Rogoff, 1987). Hence, while the election is a fundamental mechanism of 
accountability, the potential policy differences surrounding these cycles and electoral 
competitiveness can change the firms’ business environment and create uncertainty (Canes-
Wrone and Park, 2014; Gulen and Ion, 2016; Baker et al., 2016; Julio and Yook, 2016; Jens, 
2017). As stock returns have exposure to systematic economic forces (Fama and French, 1988 
1989; Campbell, 1985; Chen, 1991; Bailey and Chung, 1995), political uncertainty augments 
the expected return volatility around an election. It is empirically evidenced that return 
volatility is higher in the election year and electoral competitiveness also contributes to the 
magnitude of this volatility (Pantzalis et al., 2000; Li and Born, 2006; Białkowski et al., 2008; 
Boutchkova et al., 2012; Pasquariello and Zafeiridou, 2014). In this paper, we argue that as like 
as firm-specific negative event, investors should also trust firms with high social capital during 
political uncertainty. For instance, Guiso et al. (2008) posit that shareholders assess the 
reliability of the firm in addition to risk-return trade-off. We argue that shareholders will place 
a premium on CSR reputation, which reflects the firm’s values and integrity, during times of 
political uncertainty. Thus, we expect a negative relationship between CSR reputation and 
stock return volatility during political uncertainty. By considering election year and electoral 
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competitiveness (narrow margin of victory) as sources of political uncertainty we formulate 
our first hypothesis as follows:  
 
H1a: Firm-specific social capital reduces stock return volatility during political uncertainty. 
Moreover, electoral uncertainty generated by political factors leads firms to temporarily 
reduce investment expenditures before the election outcome (Julio and Yook, 2012). This leads 
to firms holding an option on whether to invest or not. Since the option value of delaying an 
investment increases with higher uncertainty (Bloom, 2009), firms delay investing until this 
political uncertainty resolve at the election (Rodrik, 1991). In addition, lower investment is 
associated with high cash flow volatility (Minton and Schrand, 1999).  
 
We focus on the uncertainty during U.S. gubernatorial elections. Gubernatorial elections 
engender uncertainty as governors’ preferences has impact in shaping state policies (e.g., state 
budget, tax code, subsidy policies) (Gao and Qi, 2013; Jens, 2013). Consequently, state policy 
changes have substantial influence in an economic environment where firms operate 
(Chhaochharia et al., 2012) and, therefore, in their investment and financing policies. Gao and 
Qi (2013) suggest that investors demand a risk premium for electoral uncertainty arise around 
U.S. gubernatorial elections. Jens (2013) shows that return volatility is higher for firms 
headquartered in U.S. gubernatorial election states than firms in other states. In this paper, we 
expect to find that cash flow volatility is high surrounding the election. As the extant literature 
shows that  high CSR firms are more profitable along with high growth expectation than low 
CSR firm (Russo and Fouts, 1997; Barnett, 2007; Gregory et al., 2014), we expect the cash 
flow volatility for high CSR firm is lower during political uncertainty.  We argue that in 
addition to shareholders, other stakeholders (e.g., customers, employees, and the community 
at large) will also tend to value high CSR firms more during the politically risky period. Hence, 
we predict that a negative relationship between CSR reputation and cash flow volatility exists 
during political uncertainty. Our next hypothesis is the following:   
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H1b: Firm-specific social capital reduces cash flow volatility during political uncertainty.  
2.3. Operational hedging ability of CSR reputation during import tariff cuts 
A reduction in import tariffs reduces the entrance cost and relaxes the trade barriers to 
enter the U.S. product market. Hence, a significant tariff reduction in any industry exogenously 
increases foreign competition for all domestic firms of that industry (Fresard, 2010). Fresard 
(2010) argues that the import tariff cut can be treated as exogenous in the year of tariff cut if it 
increases over the following years. To assess the operational hedging ability of CSR reputation, 
we exploit this exogenous shift in industry-level import tariffs as a quasi-natural experiment as 
this macroeconomic shock is exogenous to idiosyncratic risk and CSR investment. Exogenous 
tariff cuts creates an adverse cash flow shock to all domestic firms in the industry (Kini et al., 
2017). In this regard, we argue that this cash flow shock will be felt disproportionately by firms 
with high CSR reputation. Specifically, during this macroeconomic shock, high CSR firms will 
enjoy operational hedging benefit of CSR reputation and face lower cash flow volatility than 
low CSR firms. Thus, we expect a negative relation between CSR reputation and risk (i.e. stock 
return volatility and cash flow volatility) during years of significant tariff cut. Our final 
hypotheses are the following: 
H2a: Firms’ social capital reduces cash flow volatility during significant import tariff cuts.  
H2b: Firm’s social capital reduces stock return volatility during significant import tariff cuts.  
3. Sample and data 
Our study covers all publicly traded U.S. firms, excluding financial firms (SIC codes 6000-
6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949), in the Center for Research in the Security Prices 
(CRSP)/Compustat merged database between 2002 and 2016. We collect firms’ overall 
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) score from Asset4 ESG database provided by 
Thomson Reuters. Asset4 database provides ESG information for more than 4,300 companies 
globally (of which 2693 are US firms) since 2002. We gather CSR ratings available for all US 
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firms over 2002-2016. For the ESG score, Asset4 collects 900 evaluation points and measure 
250s key performance indicators. On the basis of these indicators, scores are measured for 4 
pillars: Economic, Social, Environmental, and Corporate Governance. An overall ESG score 
is measured as the equally weighted score of each pillar. In addition to company-reported data, 
Asset4 gathers information from NGOs, stock exchange filings and other independent news 
sources. We collect firms’ accounting data from Compustat and stock data from the Centre for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Data on Gubernatorial elections are hand collected from 
Wikipedia sources and are verified with state level election resources, upon availability, as in 
Devos and Rahman (2018). To identify significant tariff cuts we obtain U.S. import data from 
Schott's International Economics Resource Page.7 State-level unemployment rate and annual 
GDP growth rate are collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (bls.gov) and the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (bea.gov), respectively. After dropping observations with missing values 
in our control variables, the final sample consists of 43,631 firms-year observations for 5,814 
unique U.S. firms.  
We report the descriptive statistics for the main variables in Table 1. Table 1 shows the 
summary statistics for all sample firms in Panel A, firms with high CSR score in Panel B, firms 
with low CSR score in Panel C and the firms without CSR score in Panel D. Panel A  shows 
that the mean overall CSR score is 52.56, consistent with Halbritter and Dorfleitner (2015) and 
Ferrell et al. (2016). For all sample firms, average stock return volatility is 0.5439, and average 
cash flow volatility is 0.0681. Panel B, C and D illustrate that firms with high CSR score has 
relatively lower average stock return volatility (0.3112) and cash flow volatility (.0247) than 
low CSR score firms and firms without CSR score.  
                                                          
 
7 See http://faculty.som.yale.edu/peterschott/sub_international.htm 
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Baseline regressions 
We test the hedging ability of CSR reputation for stock return volatility and cash flow 
volatility separately. We rely on the following model to test the hedging ability of social capital 
during political uncertainty: 
Riski,t = α+ β1× CSR i,t + β2× Political uncertainty t + β3×CSR i,t×Political uncertainty t + Xi,t-
1 + θ + γ + ε i,t  (1) 
where Risk is measured as stock return volatility and alternatively cash flow volatility. We 
follow Hoberg and Moon (2017) and measure return volatility as the standard deviation of the 
firms’ daily logarithmic returns, multiplied by the square root of 252 trading days over a year. 
Cash flow volatility at time t is defined as the standard deviation of cash flow to assets for the 
previous three years, t-3 to t-1. As in Hoberg and Moon (2017), cash flow is measured as 
operating income before depreciation. CSRi,t is the overall ESG score of firm i on time t. For 
Political uncertainty, we use two binary variables: (i) Election which is a binary variable equal 
to one if a gubernatorial election occurred in the firm’s state of headquarter on time t, and zero 
otherwise; (ii) Close Election which is a binary variable that takes the value of one if the victory 
margin of the headquarter state’s gubernatorial election is in the lowest quartile, and zero 
otherwise. X is a vector of control variables that have been shown in the literature8 to affect 
return and cash flow volatility.9 In addition, we follow Jens (2017) to include state GDP growth 
rate and state unemployment rate to control for the state-level economic conditions. We also 
add gubernatorial Term Limit as a state level control variable, which is 1 if the incumbent 
                                                          
 
8 See Vuolteenaho (2002), Bae et al. (2004), Chen et al. (2013), Harjoto et al. (2017), Michaely et al. (2017), 
Hoberg and Moon (2017), among others. 
9 All control variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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governor has term limit on the gubernatorial election; otherwise 0. θ and γ are year and industry 
fixed effects respectively. We follow Jo and Harjoto (2011, 2012) and Jo and Na (2012) and 
use contemporaneous values of CSR measures and risk measures (i.e. stock return volatility 
and cash flow volatility).10 Firm-level financial controls, state-level GDP growth rate and 
unemployment rate are lagged by one year for all specifications.  
In line with our arguments, we expect the coefficient on the interaction term CSR × 
Political Uncertainty to be negative. Table 2, Panel A presents the OLS estimates for the impact 
of CSR reputation on stock return volatility, as a proxy for firm risk, during political 
uncertainty. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show the impact of CSR on return volatility during election 
years, close elections and post-election years, respectively. To mitigate the concern of omitted 
variable bias, we add firm-specific financial and state level macroeconomic control variables 
in columns 2, 4 and 6. In all specifications, it is clear that return volatility is higher in election 
years and the degree of uncertainty increases during close elections. Column (1) shows that the 
higher CSR rating reduces the return volatility during election year. The estimated coefficients 
indicate that firms having headquarters in states which have an upcoming gubernatorial 
election, have 0.78% higher return volatility than firms having headquarter in states without an 
upcoming election. However, for high CSR firms this return volatility difference reduces to 
0.01%, suggesting that high CSR reputation has a mitigating effect on stock volatility.  
After adding firm and state level control variables, column (2) also confirms that higher 
CSR rating reduces the return volatility during election year. In column (3), we estimate the 
                                                          
 
10 Nowadays media cycles become very shorter (Sennett, 1999). So, any good or bad news regarding business 
firms spread fast (Kirsner, 1998) and can change stakeholder perceptions as well as firm reputation immediately. 
Due to this reason, the CSR reputation consequences may have immediate impact on firm risk (Orlitzky and 
Benjamin, 2001). 
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CSR-risk relation during closely contested elections. The result shows that the hedging ability 
of CSR reputation remains effective when the degree of uncertainty of election is higher. A 
one-standard-deviation increase in CSR (29.63) is associated with a 0.89% decrease in return 
volatility during closely contested election years, with the average vote margin being 3.18%. 
Column (4) confirms that high CSR rating reduces return volatility during close elections. We 
also regress CSR on return volatility during post-election years to assess whether the hedging 
ability is transient or has a longer-term effect. Our results show that after controling for firm 
characteristics the uncertainty during post-election year becomes statistically insignificant. 
This suggests that CSR has a transient heding effect on stock volatility during political 
uncertainty. Overall, our results suggest that CSR reputation reduces stock return volatility 
during elections year and especially during close elections when the degree of uncertainty 
regarding the gubernatorial race is high. 
Table 2, Panel B presents the OLS estimates for the impact of CSR reputation on cash flow 
volatility during political uncertainty. Columns (1), (3) and (5) show that cash flow volatility 
is positively affected by the election year, closely contested elections and post-election year. 
Column (3) indicates that CSR reputation reduces cash flow volatility during close elections. 
Although, these effects become statistically insignificant after we include control variables in 
column (2), (4) and (6). Overall, we do not find strong evidence that would suggest that CSR 
reputation reduces cash flow volatility during political uncertainty. 
4.2 Instrumental variable approach 
The relation between CSR and risk can be endogenous. For instance, financially 
constrained firms lower their investment in CSR (Hong et al., 2012). Morevoer, Albuquerque 
et al. (2018) argue that higher valuation resulting from lower risk allows the firm to invest more 
on CSR (see also Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001). To tackle this endogeneity between risk and 
CSR, we employ two alternative strategies. First, we use an instrumental variable (IV) 
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approach to measure the relation between CSR and risk by instrumenting CSR with a set of 
instruments. Second, we use industry-level import tariff reductions as a quasi-natural 
experiment to isolate the causal effect of risk on CSR. In addition to these two steps, we test 
the effect of CSR reputation across different groups that are categorized based on the CSR 
score to limit the possibility of spurious correlation.  
We use an instrumental variable approach to measure the impact of CSR reputation over 
stock return volatility and cash flow volatility during political uncertainty. First, we follow the 
approach of Ferrell et al. (2016) to use the industry peers’ average of the endogenous variable 
as an instrument. Hence, our first instrument is the average CSR rating of all firms in the same 
industry, excluding the focal firm. The rationale behind this instrument is that CSR 
performance of other firms in the same industry also systematically influence CSR practices of 
the focal firm (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2011; Cheng et al., 2014). Our second instrument is the 
average CSR score of all firms in the state (excluding the focal firm) where the focal firm 
headquarter is located. Differences in the regional attitude towards CSR practice influence the 
social performance of the firm (Goss and Roberts, 2011). Rubin (2008) empirically shows that 
companies with high CSR score tend to be situated in the Democratic (blue) states that vote 
Democratic in presidential elections, whereas low CSR companies tend to be situated in 
Republican (red) states. With the same motivation, El Ghoul et al. (2011), Benlemlih (2015) 
and Dunbar et al. (2017) also use these instrumental variables to instrument CSR. Similarly, 
we assume that both instruments, which vary across firms since focal firm CSR score is 
omitted, are exogenous to the contemporaneous CSR score.  
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Table 3 reports the 2SLS estimates of the impact of CSR reputation on risk by using both 
industry and state average CSR as instruments. 11 Panel A, reports the regression estimates for 
stock return volatility. Column (1) reports the first stage regression on CSR score. The results 
show that CSR score has a positive and statistically significant relationship with the instrument. 
Columns (2) to (7) report the estimates from the second stage regressions. Column (2) confirms 
that the return volatility for the firms headquartered in states facing gubernatorial election is 
higher than other U.S. firms and CSR reputation reduces this volatility. Moreover, our results 
show that CSR’s hedging ability persists during closely contested elections. For instance, 
column (3) shows that a one-standard-deviation increase in CSR score (29.63) is associated 
with a 6.52% decrease in return volatility during the election period for firms headquartered in 
states facing gubernatorial election. According to the estimates of column (5), a one-standard-
deviation increase in CSR score  is associated with a 10.96% decrease in return volatility during 
close elections, which indicates that CSR reputation effect is stronger when the degree of 
uncertainty is higher. However, both columns (6) and (7) support our earlier findigns that 
CSR’s hedging ability is tranisent. This finding also supports Lins et al. (2017) who find  that 
the impact of CSR on firm performance becomes insignificant after the crisis. To confirm the 
strength of the instruments, we report the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistics which supports the 
validity of the employed instruments. Overall, our IV estimates confirm that CSR reputation 
can reduce stock return volatility during political uncertainty, albeit, it is a transient effect since 
it lasts only during the year of political uncertainty. 
                                                          
 
11 We repeat the 2SLS estimations with each instrument (indsutry average CSR and state average CSR) separately. 
The results, presented in appendix (Tables A1 and A2) show that the instruments are also significant individually 
and most importantly the reuslts remain qualitatively similar and significant (both statistically and economically).  
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In Panel B of Table 3, we report the 2SLS estimates of the impact of CSR reputation over 
cash flow volatility during political uncertainty by using both industry and state average CSR 
as instruments. In column (1), the first stage regression shows that both the instruments have 
significantly positive association with CSR score. The results of column (2) show that the cash 
flow volatility of firms having headquarters in upcoming gubernatorial election states is 1.02% 
percentage higher than other sample firms. A one standard deviation increase of CSR score 
hedges this volatility during election year by 1.78%. Similar to our earlier OLS results the 
impact of CSR during or after elecctions (or closely contested elections) is not statistically 
signficant when including other control variables to mitigate the concern of omitted variable 
bias. Boutchkova et al. (2012) argue that the uncertainty regarding future party orientation 
increases the uncertainty regarding future cash flows and this effect is industry-specific. Also, 
Julio and Yook (2012) show that firms increase cash holding than usual during the election 
year on a precautionary basis. We argue that these are the reasons why CSR reputation has no 
impact on cash flow volatilty during political uncertainty (gubernatorial elections). 
4.3 Tariff cut as exogenous shocks 
We exploit the exogenous shock triggered by tariff cuts as a quasi-natural experiment and 
employ a difference-in-difference approach to test the causal link between CSR reputation and 
cash flow volatility. To identify significant import tariff cut rate, we follow Fresard (2010) and 
Kini et al. (2017). We collect U.S. import data from Schott's International Economics Resource 
Page spanning 2002-2016. First, the tariff rate for each industry-year observation is calculated 
as Calculated Duties, divided by Imports by Custom Value. Next, we consider that a significant 
tariff cut in an industry-year occurs when the tariff rate is reduced by more than twice the 
average industry-wide tariff rate reduction over our sample period. Similar to Kini et al. (2016), 
to ensure that large tariff cuts are not temporary changes in tariff rates, we exclude tariff cuts 
that are followed by large percentage increase in the tariff over the three subsequent years. 
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Next, we merge the tariff cur data with the CSR score from Asset4 and firm-level accounting 
data from Compustat. Because data on tariffs for manufacturing industries, we restrict our focus 
to these industries. Finally, we create a binary variable for tariff cuts which is equal to one if 
any industry experiences a significant tariff cut, and zero otherwise. Finally, we estimate the 
following model: 
Riski,t = α + β1 CSRi,t + β2 CUTi,t + β3 CSR i,t × CUTi,t + Yi,t-1 + σ + δ +ui,t   (2) 
Here, Riski,t is measured as the stock return volatility and alternatively as cash flow 
volatility of firm i during time t. CUTi,t is a binary variable, which is one if any firm experiences 
a significant tariff cut in period t, and zero otherwise. As a first step we want to test whether 
just having a CSR score can reduce industry-wide economic risk. Therefore, CSR i,t is a binary 
variable equal to one for firms that have a CSR score and zero otherwise. Then we proceed to 
test CSR’s hedging effectiveness within the reduced sample of firms that have a CSR score. 
For this case CSR i,t is also a binary variable equal to one for firms with high CSR score and 
zero for firms with a low CSR score. We identify firms as high or low CSR firms based on the 
annual mean, median and tercile classifications. For Median classification, we split the set of 
observations into equal groups on the basis of the median value of CSR by year. Then, the 
group of firms having high CSR score than median at year t is categorized as high CSR firm 
and other firms are defined as low CSR firm. For the Mean classification, we follow the same 
procedure on the basis of mean CSR values by year. For Tercile classification, the set of 
observations are divided into equal tercile every year based on CSR score. Firms in the 1st 
tercile are classified as high CSR firm, and those in the 3rd tercile are classified as low CSR 
firm. Y is a vector of firms-specific control variables that have been shown in the literature to 
affect return and cash flow volatility and σ and δ are time and industry fixed effects 
respectively. If CSR can mitigate firm risk during time of industry-wide economic shocks, we 
expect the coefficient on the interaction term CSR× CUT to be negative.  
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The results from our estimated regression models on the impact of tariff cut on hedging 
ability of social capital are reported in Table 4. Panel A presents the results for stock return 
volatility as a risk measure. Column (1) shows that firms having a CSR score have lower stock 
return volatility during a tariff shock. This suggests that the reputational effect of firms’ social 
capital can hedge industry-wide risks. Next we proceed to test whether the magnitude of social 
capital, captured by a high vs low CSRT score has a differentiating effect regarding CSR’s 
hedging effectiveness.  Columns (2) to (4) report the estimates for the nominal CSR score, 
mean, median and tercile classifications of CSR score, respectively. The results from all 
specifications suggest that although CSR reduces the stock return volatility, the impact of CSR 
reputation on stock return volatility during significant tariff cut is not statistically significant. 
Overall, these findings suggest that as far as stock volatility is concerned, the magnitude of 
CSR has no mitigating impact on firm risk.  
Next we repeat our estimations with cash flow volatility as a risk measure. The results 
reported in Table 4, Panel B show that in all specifications, the marginal effect related to the 
interaction term between Tariff Shock and CSR is not statistically significant. From this 
difference-in-difference estimation we find that although CSR reduces stock return volatility 
and cash flow volatility and is an effective hedge against risk during political uncertainty, CSR 
reputation is not an effective hedge against firm risk during industry-wide economic shocks.  
5. Conclusion  
In this paper, we assess the hedging ability of firms’ social capital during regional political 
risk and industry-wide economic shocks (import tariff cuts). Our the paper contributes to the 
literature by investigating the CSR-risk relationship during the times of political uncertainty 
and industry-wide economic shocks while considering the potential reverse causality between 
CSR and firm risk.  We provide evidence suggesting that firm-specific social capital captured 
by CSR reputation, has a statistical and economically significant mitigating effect on stock 
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return volatility during political uncertainty. However, we do not find strong evidence that CSR 
reputation can hedge cash flow volatility triggered by political uncertainty. Moreover, our 
difference-in-difference estimation suggests that CSR is not an effective hedge against risk 
during indsutry-wide economic shocks. Finally, we find that CSR’s mitigating effect on stock 
volatility during political uncertainty is transient and dissipates following the gubernatorial 
elections. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
This table consists of summary statistics for our sample of all publicly traded U.S. firms in 
CRSP/Compustat between 2002 and 2016. We exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) 
and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949). Summary statistics for all sample firms, firms with high 
CSR score, firms with low CSR score and the firms without CSR score are reported in Panel 
A, B, C, and D respectively. Firms are classified as high and low CSR based on Tercile 
classification. All variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails. 
 
Panel A: All Firms      
 N Mean SD Min Max 
CSR 9,766 52.5579 29.6292 3.2500 98.7200 
Return Volatility 43,631 0.5439 0.3142 0.0502 2.1670 
Cash Flow Volatility 41,903 0.0681 0.1100 0.0001 0.7466 
Market-to-Book 43,631 1.5760 1.6674 0.0279 12.2359 
Leverage 43,631 0.1745 0.2001 0.0000 0.9003 
Operating Margin 43,631 -0.5655 3.8855 -33.1927 0.7835 
Investment 43,631 0.0916 0.2421 -1.0486 1.2518 
Sales Growth  43,631 0.0809 0.3397 -1.2074 1.5404 
Profitability 43,631 -0.0496 0.2772 -1.9055 0.3092 
Cash 41,903 0.1550 0.1732 0.0001 0.8740 
Negative Equity 43,631 0.0478 0.2133 0.0000 1.0000 
Term Limit 43,631 0.0430 0.2028 0.0000 1.0000 
Δ GDP  43,631 0.0388 0.0274 -0.0565 0.1295 
Unemployment  43,631 6.3382 1.9617 3.2000 12.2000 
Panel B: High CSR Firm (Based on Tercile Classification) 
 N Mean SD Min Max 
CSR 3,248 87.4654 8.9516 50.0300 98.7200 
Return Volatility 3,248 0.3112 0.1522 0.0963 1.3228 
Cash Flow Volatility 3,139 0.0247 0.0386 0.0003 0.7466 
Market-to-Book 3,248 1.5421 1.2327 0.0279 12.2359 
Leverage 3,248 0.2174 0.1392 0.0000 0.9003 
Operating Margin 3,248 0.1883 0.1644 -3.6281 0.7402 
Investment 3,248 0.0529 0.1418 -1.0486 1.2518 
Sales Growth  3,248 0.0422 0.1692 -1.2074 1.5404 
Profitability 3,248 0.0652 0.0877 -1.9055 0.3092 
Cash 3,139 0.0962 0.0814 0.0001 0.7874 
Negative Equity 3,248 0.0262 0.1597 0.0000 1.0000 
Panel C: Low CSR Firm (Based on Tercile Classification)   
 N Mean SD Min Max 
CSR 3,262 20.8853 8.9451 3.2500 40.8700 
Return Volatility 3,262 0.4122 0.2110 0.1101 2.0882 
Cash Flow Volatility 3,151 0.0448 0.0752 0.0002 0.7466 
Market-to-Book 3,262 1.8768 1.8697 0.0279 12.2359 
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Leverage 3,262 0.2301 0.2114 0.0000 0.9003 
Operating Margin 3,262 -0.1573 2.7726 -33.1927 0.7835 
Investment 3,262 0.1346 0.2319 -1.0486 1.2518 
Sales Growth  3,262 0.1115 0.3012 -1.2074 1.5404 
Profitability 3,262 0.0179 0.1723 -1.9055 0.3092 
Cash 3,151 0.1300 0.1377 0.0001 0.8740 
Negative Equity 3,262 0.0490 0.2160 0.0000 1.0000 
 
Panel D: No CSR Firm       
 N Mean SD Min Max 
Return Volatility 33,865 0.5956 0.3241 0.0502 2.1670 
Cash Flow Volatility 32,465 0.0782 0.1194 0.0001 0.7466 
Market-to-Book 33,865 1.5466 1.6963 0.0279 12.2359 
Leverage 33,865 0.1612 0.2037 0.0000 0.9003 
Operating Margin 33,865 -0.7462 4.2992 -33.1927 0.7835 
Investment 33,865 0.0920 0.2553 -1.0486 1.2518 
Sales Growth  33,865 0.0825 0.3644 -1.2074 1.5404 
Profitability 33,865 -0.0766 0.3015 -1.9055 0.3092 
Cash 32,465 0.1673 0.1855 0.0001 0.8740 
Negative Equity 33,865 0.0507 0.2195 0.0000 1.0000 
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Table 2. The relationship between CSR reputation and risk during Political Uncertainty 
This table reports OLS estimates of CSR reputation and risk. As risk measure, we use return volatility and cash flow volatility as dependent variable 
in Panel A and B respectively. Stock return volatility is the standard deviation of the firms’ daily logarithmic returns, multiplied by the square root 
of 252 trading days. Cash flow volatility, which is standard deviation of cash flow to assets for the previous three years. To measure political 
uncertainty, we use two binary variables: (i) Election, a binary variable equal to one if a gubernatorial election occurred in the firm’s state of 
headquarters on time t, and zero otherwise; (ii) Close, a binary variable equal to one if the vote margin between top two candidates remains in the 
lowest quartile, and zero otherwise. Post-election is a binary variable equal to one if a gubernatorial election occurred in the firm’s state of 
headquarters lagged by a year (t-1). Values of risk and CSR measures are contemporaneous. All firm-level financial controls, state-level GDP 
growth rate and unemployment rate are lagged by one year. All variables are defined in the Appendix. All regressions include industry and year 
fixed effects. We use heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the firm level, which are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails. 
Panel A: Stock Return Volatility      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
CSR -0.0033*** -0.0030*** -0.0033*** -0.0029*** -0.0033*** -0.0030*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Election  0.0078* 0.0123***     
 (0.0042) (0.0043)     
CSR*Election 0.0001* 0.0001**     
 (0.0001) (0.0001)     
Close Election   0.0249*** 0.0266***   
   (0.0066) (0.0064)   
CSR* Close Election   -0.0003** -0.0003**   
   (0.0001) (0.0001)   
Post-election     0.0066* 0.0053 
     (0.0037) (0.0037) 
CSR* Post-election     0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
     (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Market-to-Book  -0.0096***  -0.0096***  -0.0096*** 
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  (0.0013)  (0.0013)  (0.0013) 
Leverage  -0.0952***  -0.0950***  -0.0952*** 
  (0.0134)  (0.0134)  (0.0134) 
Operating Margin  -0.0132***  -0.0132***  -0.0132*** 
  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006) 
Investment  -0.0534***  -0.0536***  -0.0534*** 
  (0.0077)  (0.0076)  (0.0077) 
Sales Growth   0.0002  0.0001  0.0000 
  (0.0054)  (0.0054)  (0.0054) 
Negative Equity  0.2589***  0.2588***  0.2587*** 
  (0.0129)  (0.0129)  (0.0129) 
Term Limit  -0.0266***  -0.0253***  -0.0204*** 
  (0.0065)  (0.0061)  (0.0060) 
Δ GDP   0.0523  0.0901  0.0472 
  (0.0764)  (0.0763)  (0.0765) 
Unemployment   0.0066***  0.0067***  0.0066*** 
  (0.0019)  (0.0019)  (0.0019) 
Constant 0.6396*** 0.6338*** 0.6366*** 0.6321*** 0.6467*** 0.6443*** 
 (0.0415) (0.0401) (0.0416) (0.0402) (0.0415) (0.0401) 
       
Observations 43,631 43,631 43,631 43,631 43,631 43,631 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj R-squared 0.296 0.352 0.296 0.352 0.296 0.352 
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Panel B: Cash Flow Volatility      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
CSR -0.0007*** -0.0002*** -0.0007*** -0.0002*** -0.0007*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Election  0.0045*** 0.0014     
 (0.0015) (0.0014)     
CSR*Election -0.0000 0.0000     
 (0.0000) (0.0000)     
Close Election   0.0096*** 0.0027   
   (0.0024) (0.0019)   
CSR* Close Election   -0.0001** -0.0000   
   (0.0000) (0.0000)   
Post-election     0.0035** 0.0013 
     (0.0016) (0.0013) 
CSR* Post-election     -0.0000 -0.0000 
     (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Market-to-Book  0.0103***  0.0103***  0.0103*** 
  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0007) 
Leverage  -0.0200***  -0.0200***  -0.0200*** 
  (0.0042)  (0.0042)  (0.0042) 
Profitability  -0.1763***  -0.1763***  -0.1764*** 
  (0.0045)  (0.0045)  (0.0045) 
Cash  0.1081***  0.1081***  0.1081*** 
  (0.0064)  (0.0064)  (0.0064) 
Investment  0.0073**  0.0073**  0.0073** 
  (0.0033)  (0.0033)  (0.0033) 
Negative Equity  0.0306***  0.0306***  0.0306*** 
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  (0.0039)  (0.0039)  (0.0039) 
Term Limit  -0.0019  -0.0018  -0.0013 
  (0.0020)  (0.0019)  (0.0019) 
Δ GDP   -0.0422*  -0.0385  -0.0429* 
  (0.0247)  (0.0247)  (0.0246) 
Unemployment   -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0002 
  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006) 
Constant 0.0427*** 0.0217*** 0.0427*** 0.0217*** 0.0464*** 0.0228*** 
 (0.0081) (0.0066) (0.0081) (0.0065) (0.0081) (0.0065) 
       
Observations 41,903 41,903 41,903 41,903 41,903 41,903 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj R-squared 0.141 0.458 0.141 0.458 0.141 0.458 
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Table 3. The relationship between CSR reputation and risk during Political Uncertainty 
This table presents the results of instrumental variable (IV) approach, which estimates the relationship between CSR reputation and risk during 
political uncertainty over the sample period of 2002-2016. As risk measure, we use return volatility and cash flow volatility as dependent variable 
in Panel A and B respectively. Stock return volatility is the standard deviation of the firms’ daily logarithmic returns, multiplied by the square root 
of 252 trading days. Cash flow volatility, which is standard deviation of cash flow to assets for the previous three years. CSR is the overall ESG 
score instrumented with two instruments jointly: the average CSR rating for each state-year pair and industry-year pair. The results of 1st stage are 
presented in column 1. Column 2, 4 and 6 contains results of 2nd stage regression without control variables. In columns 3, 5 and 7, we report the 
2nd stage regression outcomes with control variables. To measure political uncertainty, we use two binary variables: (i) Election, a binary variable 
equal to one if a gubernatorial election occurred in the firm’s state of headquarters on time t, and zero otherwise; (ii) Close, a binary variable equal 
to one if the vote margin between top two candidates remains in the lowest quartile, and zero otherwise. Post-election is a binary variable equal to 
one if a gubernatorial election occurred in the firm’s state of headquarters lagged by a year (t-1). Values of risk and CSR measures are 
contemporaneous. All firm-level financial controls, state-level GDP growth rate, and unemployment rate are lagged by one year. All variables are 
defined in the Appendix. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. We use heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level, which are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails. 
 
Panel A: Stock return volatility - Industry and State Average CSR as Instruments    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                
Industry Average CSR 0.1970***       
 (0.0373)       
State Average CSR 0.2939***       
 (0.0926)       
CSR  -0.0071*** -0.0064*** -0.0074*** -0.0067*** -0.0076*** -0.0069*** 
  (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Election   0.0330*** 0.0358***     
  (0.0070) (0.0069)     
CSR*Election  -0.0024*** -0.0022***     
  (0.0004) (0.0004)     
Close Election    0.0600*** 0.0664***   
    (0.0120) (0.0120)   
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CSR* Close Election    -0.0034*** -0.0037***   
    (0.0009) (0.0009)   
Post-election      0.0098* 0.0079 
      (0.0059) (0.0058) 
CSR* Post-election      -0.0001 -0.0001 
      (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Market-to-Book 1.0837***  -0.0054***  -0.0056***  -0.0055*** 
 (0.1614)  (0.0019)  (0.0019)  (0.0019) 
Leverage 13.7432***  -0.0383*  -0.0372*  -0.0390* 
 (1.4961)  (0.0211)  (0.0211)  (0.0210) 
Operating Margin 0.6228***  -0.0105***  -0.0105***  -0.0106*** 
 (0.0516)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010) 
Investment -3.2970***  -0.0671***  -0.0673***  -0.0670*** 
 (0.5007)  (0.0085)  (0.0085)  (0.0085) 
Sales Growth  -2.5651***  -0.0102*  -0.0098  -0.0102* 
 (0.2802)  (0.0061)  (0.0061)  (0.0061) 
Negative Equity -8.8441***  0.2224***  0.2224***  0.2229*** 
 (0.9852)  (0.0165)  (0.0165)  (0.0164) 
Term Limit -0.7257  -0.0285***  -0.0332***  -0.0242*** 
 (0.5542)  (0.0073)  (0.0068)  (0.0064) 
Δ GDP  -8.3323  0.0024  0.0801  0.0016 
 (8.0094)  (0.0826)  (0.0828)  (0.0828) 
Unemployment  0.4454  0.0090***  0.0095***  0.0091*** 
 (0.3028)  (0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0024) 
Constant -2.5605 0.6418*** 0.6113*** 0.6423*** 0.6079*** 0.6641*** 0.6361*** 
 (10.6990) (0.0777) (0.0727) (0.0761) (0.0715) (0.0763) (0.0713) 
        
Observations 43,631 43,631 43,631 43,631 43,631 43,631 43,631 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cragg-Donald Wald   143.2 121.1 143.4 121.4 143.2 121 
        
Panel B: Cash Flow Volatility- Industry and State Average CSR as Instruments    
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                
Industry Average CSR 0.1808***       
 (0.0357)       
State Average CSR 0.2231**       
 (0.0909)       
CSR  -0.0030*** -0.0010*** -0.0031*** -0.0010*** -0.0031*** -0.0010*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) 
Election   0.0102*** 0.0026     
  (0.0025) (0.0021)     
CSR*Election  -0.0006*** -0.0001     
  (0.0002) (0.0001)     
Close Election    0.0170*** 0.0033   
    (0.0042) (0.0032)   
CSR* Close Election    -0.0006** 0.0000   
    (0.0003) (0.0002)   
Post-election      0.0043* 0.0014 
      (0.0025) (0.0020) 
CSR* Post-election      -0.0001 -0.0000 
      (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Market-to-Book 1.5925***  0.0115***  0.0115***  0.0115*** 
 (0.1628)  (0.0008)  (0.0008)  (0.0008) 
Leverage 11.7204***  -0.0104*  -0.0104*  -0.0105* 
 (1.5420)  (0.0055)  (0.0055)  (0.0055) 
Profitability 13.8050***  -0.1648***  -0.1648***  -0.1649*** 
 (0.8129)  (0.0060)  (0.0060)  (0.0060) 
Cash -15.1309***  0.0952***  0.0951***  0.0953*** 
 (1.4490)  (0.0079)  (0.0079)  (0.0079) 
Investment -6.2278***  0.0021  0.0021  0.0022 
 (0.5825)  (0.0037)  (0.0037)  (0.0037) 
Negative Equity -5.1783***  0.0264***  0.0264***  0.0264*** 
 (0.9623)  (0.0042)  (0.0042)  (0.0042) 
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Term Limit -1.0414*  -0.0030  -0.0029  -0.0023 
 (0.5512)  (0.0021)  (0.0020)  (0.0019) 
Δ GDP  -8.7576  -0.0512**  -0.0465*  -0.0517** 
 (8.0219)  (0.0257)  (0.0258)  (0.0256) 
Unemployment  0.7168**  0.0005  0.0005  0.0005 
 (0.3028)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0007) 
Constant -2.3963 0.0500 0.0196* 0.0509 0.0200* 0.0570* 0.0214* 
 (10.8067) (0.0328) (0.0117) (0.0323) (0.0116) (0.0323) (0.0115) 
        
Observations 41,903 41,903 41,903 41,903 41,903 41,903 41,903 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cragg-Donald Wald   146.4 95.85 147.1 96.73 146.8 96.44 
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Table 4: How CSR affects firm risk during tariff cuts. 
This table presents the relationship between CSR reputation and risk during import tariff cuts 
over the sample period of 2002-2016. Treatment firms are firms that belong to the industry 
which experience a tariff cut shock during 2002-2016. As risk measure, we use return volatility 
and cash flow volatility as dependent variable in Panel A and B respectively. Stock return 
volatility is the standard deviation of the firms’ daily logarithmic returns multiplied by the 
square root of 252 trading days. Cash flow volatility is standard deviation of cash flow to assets 
for the previous three years. CSR/No CSR is a binary variable equal to one for firms that have 
a CSR score and zero otherwise. CSR score is the continuous score for the sub-sample of firms 
that have a CSR score. High CSR Score (Mean) is a binary variable that takes the value of one 
for those firms with a CSR score that is higher than the annual mean CSR score in year t, 
excluding firms that have no CSR score, and zero otherwise. High CSR Score (Median) is a 
binary variable that takes the value of one for those firms with a CSR score that is higher than 
the annual median CSR score in year t, excluding firms that have no CSR score, and zero 
otherwise. High CSR Score (Median) is a binary variable that takes the value of one for those 
firms with a CSR score that is in the top tercile of the annual CSR score in year t, excluding 
firms that have no CSR score, and zero otherwise. Tariff cut is a binary variable, which is equal 
to one if the annual percentage drop of the import tariff rate is twice the industry average, and 
zero otherwise. Values of risk and CSR measures are contemporaneous. All firm-level financial 
controls, state-level GDP growth rate, and unemployment rate are lagged by one year. All 
regressions include industry and year fixed effects. We use heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm level, which are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% tails. 
 
Panel A: Stock Return Volatility 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
CSR/No 
CSR CSR Score 
High CSR 
Score 
(Mean) 
High CSR 
Score 
(Median) 
High CSR 
Score 
(Tercile) 
CSR -0.2125*** -0.0015*** -0.0678*** -0.0699*** -0.1033*** 
 (0.0078) (0.0001) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0101) 
Tariff CUT -0.1302*** -0.0113 0.0571 0.0582 0.0364 
 (0.0471) (0.0957) (0.0732) (0.0723) (0.0743) 
CSR* Tariff CUT 0.1209** -0.0002 -0.1136 -0.1119 -0.0561 
 (0.0600) (0.0011) (0.0805) (0.0797) (0.0823) 
Market-to-Book -0.0032* 0.0029 0.0035 0.0036 0.0040 
 (0.0018) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0028) 
Leverage -0.0780*** 0.0749* 0.0806** 0.0811** 0.0616 
 (0.0206) (0.0389) (0.0398) (0.0397) (0.0464) 
Operating Margin -0.0110*** -0.0175*** -0.0185*** -0.0182*** -0.0176*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0029) 
Investment -0.0520*** 0.0455** 0.0596*** 0.0577*** 0.0607** 
 (0.0106) (0.0219) (0.0221) (0.0220) (0.0274) 
Sales Growth  0.0002 0.0194 0.0242 0.0229 0.0242 
 (0.0064) (0.0158) (0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0196) 
Negative Equity 0.2602*** 0.1423*** 0.1445*** 0.1436*** 0.1411*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0451) (0.0453) (0.0453) (0.0518) 
Constant 1.0123*** 0.8392*** 0.8525*** 0.8129*** 0.8020*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0225) (0.0232) (0.0222) (0.0275) 
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Observations 17,558 3,800 3,800 3,800 2,616 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj R-squared 0.365 0.465 0.445 0.447 0.464 
 
Panel B: Cash Flow Volatility 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
CSR/No 
CSR CSR Score 
High CSR 
Score 
(Mean) 
High CSR 
Score 
(Median) 
High CSR 
Score 
(Tercile) 
CSR -0.0181*** -0.0001** -0.0039 -0.0052** -0.0062* 
 (0.0022) (0.0000) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0037) 
Tariff CUT -0.0053 -0.0076 0.0029 0.0024 0.0004 
 (0.0075) (0.0120) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0084) 
CSR* Tariff CUT -0.0055 0.0000 -0.0111 -0.0104 0.0015 
 (0.0089) (0.0001) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0091) 
Market-to-Book 0.0087*** 0.0075*** 0.0076*** 0.0075*** 0.0085*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0016) 
Leverage -0.0293*** 0.0212 0.0213 0.0214 0.0280 
 (0.0084) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0194) 
Profitability -0.1925*** -0.1781*** -0.1799*** -0.1793*** -0.1874*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0230) (0.0227) (0.0228) (0.0276) 
Cash 0.1123*** 0.1373*** 0.1388*** 0.1381*** 0.1509*** 
 (0.0098) (0.0334) (0.0336) (0.0335) (0.0414) 
Investment 0.0006 -0.0075 -0.0062 -0.0068 -0.0071 
 (0.0052) (0.0126) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0156) 
Negative Equity 0.0375*** 0.0368** 0.0368** 0.0368** 0.0398* 
 (0.0076) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0208) 
Constant 0.1004*** 0.1202*** 0.1178*** 0.1183*** 0.0922*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0059) (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0058) 
      
Observations 17,151 3,699 3,699 3,697 2,549 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj R-squared 0.492 0.401 0.400 0.400 0.428 
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions  
Variables  Definitions 
CSR Equally-weighted Overall ESG score from Asset4. 
Return Volatility The standard deviation of the firms’ daily logarithmic returns (source: 
CRSP), multiplied by the square root of the 252 total trading days 
over a year.  
Cash flow Operating Income before depreciation (Compustat item OIBDP).  
Cash Flow Volatility The standard deviation of cash flow (Compustat item OIBDP) scaled 
by total assets (Compustat item AT) for the previous 3 years, t-3 to t-
1. 
Election Binary variable, which is equal to one if a gubernatorial election 
occurred in the firm’s state of headquarters on time t, otherwise it 
equals zero. 
Close Election 
 
Binary variable, which is equal to one if the victory margin of the 
headquarter state’s gubernatorial election at year t is at the lowest 
quartile, otherwise it equals zero. 
Market to Book  Market value of equity (Compustat item PRCC times item CSHO) 
over total assets (Compustat item AT).  
Leverage Long-term debt (Compustat item DLTT) over total assets (Compustat 
item AT). 
Operating margin Operating income before depreciation (Compustat item OIBDP) 
scaled by sales (Compustat item SALE). 
Investment  Percentage change in gross plant, property, and equipment 
(Compustat item PPEGT) from year t-1 to year t.  
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Sales growth Growth in sales from year t-1 to year t (Compustat item SALE). 
Profitability  The ratio of net income before extraordinary items (Compustat item 
NI) to total assets (Compustat item AT). 
Cash Cash (Compustat item CH) scaled by total assets (Compustat item 
AT). 
Negative Equity Equal to 1 if the book value of equity (Compustat item CEQ) over 
market value of equity (Compustat item PRCC times item CSHO) is 
negative, otherwise 0.  
Term Limit Equal to 1 if the incumbent governor has term limit on gubernatorial 
election, otherwise 0. 
Δ GDP Annual percentage change in state GDP.  
Unemployment Annual state-level unemployment rate. 
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Table A1. The relationship between CSR reputation and risk during Political Uncertainty 
This table presents the results of instrumental variable (IV) approach, which estimates the relationship between CSR reputation and risk during 
political uncertainty over the sample period of 2002-2016. As risk measure, we use stock return volatility as dependent variable.  Stock return 
volatility is the standard deviation of the firms’ daily logarithmic returns, multiplied by the square root of 252 trading days. CSR is the overall ESG 
score instrumented with two instruments separately: the average CSR rating for each industry-year pair (Panel A) and state-year pair (Panel B). 
The results of 1st stage are presented in column 1. Column 2, 4 and 6 contains results of 2nd stage regression without control variables. In columns 
3, 5 and 7, we report the 2nd stage regression outcomes with control variables. To measure political uncertainty, we use two binary variables: (i) 
Election, a binary variable equal to one if a gubernatorial election occurred in the firm’s state of headquarters on time t, and zero otherwise; (ii) 
Close, a binary variable equal to one if the vote margin between top two candidates remains in the lowest quartile, and zero otherwise. Post-
election is a binary variable equal to one if a gubernatorial election occurred in the firm’s state of headquarters lagged by a year (t-1). Values of 
risk and CSR measures are contemporaneous. All firm-level financial controls, state-level GDP growth rate, and unemployment rate are lagged 
by one year. All variables are defined in the Appendix. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. We use heteroscedasticity robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level, which are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails. 
 
Panel A: Stock return volatility - Industry Average CSR as Instruments    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ind_CSR10 0.2005***       
 (0.0375)       
CSR  -0.0057*** -0.0047*** -0.0060*** -0.0049*** -0.0062*** -0.0051*** 
  (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Election   0.0285*** 0.0312***     
  (0.0066) (0.0065)     
CSR*Election  -0.0019*** -0.0017***     
  (0.0004) (0.0004)     
Close Election    0.0554*** 0.0578***   
    (0.0122) (0.0118)   
CSR* Close Election    -0.0030*** -0.0030***   
    (0.0009) (0.0009)   
Post-election      0.0065 0.0052 
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      (0.0057) (0.0056) 
CSR* Post-election      0.0002 0.0002 
      (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Market-to-Book 1.0572***  -0.0074***  -0.0075***  -0.0075*** 
 (0.1616)  (0.0018)  (0.0017)  (0.0017) 
Leverage 13.9689***  -0.0652***  -0.0640***  -0.0658*** 
 (1.5005)  (0.0202)  (0.0202)  (0.0201) 
Operating Margin 0.6288***  -0.0118***  -0.0118***  -0.0118*** 
 (0.0517)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009) 
Investment -3.4353***  -0.0606***  -0.0608***  -0.0605*** 
 (0.5066)  (0.0084)  (0.0084)  (0.0084) 
Sales Growth  -2.5655***  -0.0052  -0.0050  -0.0053 
 (0.2810)  (0.0061)  (0.0061)  (0.0061) 
Negative Equity -8.9496***  0.2396***  0.2394***  0.2400*** 
 (0.9891)  (0.0163)  (0.0163)  (0.0163) 
Term Limit -0.9462*  -0.0272***  -0.0305***  -0.0224*** 
 (0.5627)  (0.0068)  (0.0064)  (0.0062) 
Δ GDP  -12.4487  0.0251  0.0936  0.0236 
 (8.2756)  (0.0790)  (0.0791)  (0.0790) 
Unemployment  0.5951**  0.0079***  0.0083***  0.0079*** 
 (0.3022)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021) 
Constant -2.6576 0.6386*** 0.6179*** 0.6381*** 0.6151*** 0.6586*** 0.6401*** 
 (10.8940) (0.0645) (0.0557) (0.0636) (0.0552) (0.0636) (0.0547) 
        
Observations 43,631 43,631 43,631 43,631 43,631 43,631 43,631 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cragg-Donald Wald   213 187.9 214.6 189.2 214.2 188.9 
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Panel B: Stock return volatility - State  Average CSR as Instruments    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
State Average CSR 0.3115***       
 (0.0934)       
CSR  -0.0108*** -0.0124*** -0.0113*** -0.0127*** -0.0114*** -0.0130*** 
  (0.0027) (0.0034) (0.0027) (0.0035) (0.0028) (0.0036) 
Election   0.0391*** 0.0419***     
  (0.0098) (0.0100)     
CSR*Election  -0.0031*** -0.0029***     
  (0.0008) (0.0008)     
Close Election    0.0614*** 0.0727***   
    (0.0147) (0.0160)   
CSR* Close Election    -0.0034*** -0.0040***   
    (0.0012) (0.0013)   
Post-election      0.0161* 0.0102 
      (0.0092) (0.0095) 
CSR* Post-election      -0.0008 -0.0004 
      (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Market-to-Book 1.0608***  0.0009  0.0006  0.0009 
 (0.1622)  (0.0042)  (0.0042)  (0.0042) 
Leverage 13.9855***  0.0487  0.0486  0.0492 
 (1.5055)  (0.0533)  (0.0530)  (0.0537) 
Operating Margin 0.6566***  -0.0065***  -0.0065***  -0.0065*** 
 (0.0517)  (0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0024) 
Investment -3.2932***  -0.0880***  -0.0880***  -0.0883*** 
 (0.5056)  (0.0144)  (0.0144)  (0.0145) 
Sales Growth  -2.5973***  -0.0261**  -0.0254**  -0.0263** 
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 (0.2821)  (0.0107)  (0.0106)  (0.0107) 
Negative Equity -8.9727***  0.1668***  0.1677***  0.1666*** 
 (1.0058)  (0.0355)  (0.0353)  (0.0358) 
Term Limit -0.7097  -0.0333***  -0.0397***  -0.0302*** 
 (0.5567)  (0.0099)  (0.0092)  (0.0085) 
Δ GDP  -7.2600  -0.0696  0.0177  -0.0697 
 (8.0259)  (0.1108)  (0.1108)  (0.1121) 
Unemployment  0.4657  0.0128***  0.0133***  0.0129*** 
 (0.3033)  (0.0041)  (0.0040)  (0.0041) 
Constant -1.8916 0.6544*** 0.5956*** 0.6578*** 0.5932*** 0.6795*** 0.6233*** 
 (10.3355) (0.1154) (0.1343) (0.1128) (0.1313) (0.1136) (0.1328) 
        
Observations 43,631 43,631 43,631 43,631 43,631 43,631 43,631 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cragg-Donald Wald   80.38 59.46 79.22 58.76 79.66 58.66 
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Table A2. The relationship between CSR reputation and risk during Political Uncertainty 
This table presents the results of instrumental variable (IV) approach, which estimates the relationship between CSR reputation and risk during 
political uncertainty over the sample period of 2002-2016. As risk measure, we use cash flow volatility as dependent variable. Cash flow volatility, 
which is standard deviation of cash flow to assets for the previous three years. CSR is the overall ESG score instrumented with two instruments 
separately: the average CSR rating for each industry-year pair (Panel A) and state-year pair (Panel B). The results of 1st stage are presented in 
column 1. Column 2, 4 and 6 contains results of 2nd stage regression without control variables. In columns 3, 5 and 7, we report the 2nd stage 
regression outcomes with control variables. To measure political uncertainty, we use two binary variables: (i) Election, a binary variable equal to 
one if a gubernatorial election occurred in the firm’s state of headquarters on time t, and zero otherwise; (ii) Close, a binary variable equal to one 
if the vote margin between top two candidates remains in the lowest quartile, and zero otherwise. Post-election is a binary variable equal to one if 
a gubernatorial election occurred in the firm’s state of headquarters lagged by a year (t-1). Values of risk and CSR measures are contemporaneous. 
All firm-level financial controls, state-level GDP growth rate, and unemployment rate are lagged by one year. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. We use heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the firm level, 
which are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails. 
 
 
Panel A: Cash Flow Volatility - Industry Average CSR as Instrument      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                
Industry Average CSR 0.1830***       
 (0.0359)       
CSR  -0.0028*** -0.0010*** -0.0029*** -0.0010*** -0.0029*** -0.0010*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) 
Election   0.0087*** 0.0021     
  (0.0024) (0.0020)     
CSR*Election  -0.0005*** -0.0000     
  (0.0002) (0.0001)     
Close Election    0.0160*** 0.0029   
    (0.0046) (0.0031)   
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CSR* Close Election    -0.0006 0.0000   
    (0.0003) (0.0002)   
Post-election      0.0028 0.0004 
      (0.0024) (0.0019) 
CSR* Post-election      -0.0000 0.0000 
      (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Market-to-Book 1.5853***  0.0115***  0.0115***  0.0115*** 
 (0.1629)  (0.0008)  (0.0008)  (0.0008) 
Leverage 11.8260***  -0.0109**  -0.0110**  -0.0109** 
 (1.5451)  (0.0055)  (0.0055)  (0.0055) 
Profitability 13.9188***  -0.1655***  -0.1655***  -0.1655*** 
 (0.8135)  (0.0060)  (0.0060)  (0.0060) 
Cash -15.4772***  0.0959***  0.0959***  0.0959*** 
 (1.4489)  (0.0079)  (0.0079)  (0.0079) 
Investment -6.3549***  0.0024  0.0024  0.0024 
 (0.5885)  (0.0037)  (0.0037)  (0.0037) 
Negative Equity -5.2165***  0.0266***  0.0267***  0.0266*** 
 (0.9651)  (0.0042)  (0.0042)  (0.0042) 
Term Limit -1.2745**  -0.0030  -0.0028  -0.0023 
 (0.5595)  (0.0021)  (0.0020)  (0.0019) 
Δ GDP  -11.8706  -0.0507**  -0.0463*  -0.0511** 
 (8.2614)  (0.0256)  (0.0257)  (0.0256) 
Unemployment  0.8440***  0.0004  0.0004  0.0004 
 (0.3024)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0007) 
Constant -2.4514 0.0502 0.0199* 0.0505* 0.0203* 0.0565* 0.0216* 
 (10.9674) (0.0310) (0.0112) (0.0307) (0.0112) (0.0307) (0.0111) 
        
Observations 41,903 41,903 41,903 41,903 41,903 41,903 41,903 
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Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cragg-Donald Wald   223.9 160.2 225.9 161.6 225.6 161.8 
        
Panel B: Cash Flow Volatility - State Average CSR as Instrument      
        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                
State Average CSR 0.2369***       
 (0.0917)       
CSR  -0.0034*** -0.0012* -0.0036*** -0.0012* -0.0035*** -0.0011 
  (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0007) 
Election   0.0130*** 0.0036     
  (0.0036) (0.0029)     
CSR*Election  -0.0009*** -0.0002     
  (0.0003) (0.0002)     
Close Election    0.0174*** 0.0037   
    (0.0051) (0.0039)   
CSR* Close Election    -0.0007 -0.0000   
    (0.0004) (0.0003)   
Post-election      0.0081** 0.0037 
      (0.0038) (0.0030) 
CSR* Post-election      -0.0005* -0.0003 
      (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Market-to-Book 1.5842***  0.0118***  0.0119***  0.0118*** 
 (0.1628)  (0.0013)  (0.0013)  (0.0013) 
Leverage 11.8606***  -0.0081  -0.0077  -0.0083 
 (1.5489)  (0.0095)  (0.0096)  (0.0095) 
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Profitability 14.2469***  -0.1620***  -0.1616***  -0.1623*** 
 (0.8162)  (0.0112)  (0.0113)  (0.0112) 
Cash -15.8292***  0.0921***  0.0916***  0.0923*** 
 (1.4649)  (0.0136)  (0.0137)  (0.0136) 
Investment -6.3411***  0.0009  0.0007  0.0010 
 (0.5886)  (0.0057)  (0.0058)  (0.0057) 
Negative Equity -5.1712***  0.0254***  0.0253***  0.0255*** 
 (0.9778)  (0.0055)  (0.0055)  (0.0055) 
Term Limit -1.0654*  -0.0032  -0.0033  -0.0025 
 (0.5525)  (0.0022)  (0.0022)  (0.0020) 
Δ GDP  -7.8737  -0.0535**  -0.0485*  -0.0539** 
 (8.0237)  (0.0269)  (0.0271)  (0.0268) 
Unemployment  0.7465**  0.0006  0.0007  0.0006 
 (0.3027)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009) 
Constant -1.7198 0.0504 0.0186 0.0530 0.0194 0.0586 0.0209 
 (10.4491) (0.0378) (0.0137) (0.0374) (0.0137) (0.0371) (0.0132) 
        
Observations 41,903 41,903 41,903 41,903 41,903 41,903 41,903 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cragg-Donald Wald   76.04 34.87 74.32 34.20 75.69 34.52 
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